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RICHARD 1. FINE*

The Control of
Restrictive Business Practices
in International TradeA Viable Proposal for an
International Trade Organizationt
Part I. Introduction
The effects of restrictive business practices in international trade have
been known to every businessman, government official, lawyer and housewife who has had the slightest contact with "foreign goods or products."
These effects have formulated and controlled the consuming habits of
many people in both rich and poor nations, yet the controlled consumer has
been unable himself to control the "foreign cartel, concentration or multinational corporation."
Much of this lack of consumer control has been due to the jealous
protection of "sovereignty" by the nation in which the cartel, concentration
or corporation has its situs, or by the unwillingness of such a nation to
cooperate with a consuming nation in the removal of the abuse. However,
in today's world economy no nation is merely a producer or merely a
consumer, thus the luxury of non-action toward the effect of a restrictive
business practice no longer exists for any nation. Such luxury may even be
said to be not in the enlightened self interest of such a nation.
This "proposal" contends that it is pre-eminently in the interest of all
nations to control the effects of restrictive business practices; not to attempt such control would be a dereliction of the duty of a government to
*B.S., Univ. of Wisconsin; J.D., Univ. of Chicago Law School; Ph.D. (International
Law), Univ. of London, London School of Economics and Political Science. The author was
an attorney with the Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, and is presently practicing law in Beverely Hills, California.
tThis article formed the basis of a course taught for the Overseas Program of the
University of Syracuse Law School during 1970, 1971 and 1972, and is presently the basis of
a study being conducted by the American Bar Association. All statements in this article are
strictly opinions of the author and in no way reflect the viewpoint of the Department of
Justice.
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protect its constituents. In recent years many governments have accepted
the above challenge, and have enacted domestic legislation to control the
effects of restrictive business practices.
The problem has never been solved at the international level. It is the
purpose of the Draft Treaty attached hereto, (1) to remedy this void of
international enforcement and (2) to offer a foundation upon which nations
may construct the protection which all consumers so desperately need.
The effect of restrictive business practices has been a frontier subject to
both the international and the comparative lawyer. It has been mentioned
in recent books,' in International Law Commentaries, 2 in law review
articles, 3 and infrequently in theses. 4 For the most part, however, the
uncovering of basic underlying concepts has not been achieved. In the area
of extra territorial effects of restrictive-practice legislation, while a veritable mountain of material exists, 5 this same uncovering has also not been
achieved.
Although conferences have been held in attempts to explore the substantive law in addition to the extra-territorial questions, 6 neither procedural
nor substantive uniformity was gained. The modern history of attempts to
control International Anti Trust Law, with respect to substantive uniformity exist primarily in the Havana Charter and the United Nations Draft,
although the Council of Europe attempted, and G.A.T.T. discussed an
attempt. At the international level success has yet to be achieved.
It is the contention of this "proposal" that substantive uniformity does in
fact exist. The discovery of this uniformity may be found through the
'Cf. Corwin D. Edwards, Trade Regulations Overseas, OCEANA 1966, which summarizes 2the law of some countries up to 1965.
cf. The Changing Structure of International Law by Wolfgang Friedman in which
International Anti-Trust Law is mentioned.
3
The subject is usually covered by a note or a comment in an article describing the
restrictive practice laws of a "foreign country." Cf., Guide to Legal Periodicals, Anti-Trust,
Foreign or Cartels.
4
Ph.D. Thesis of U. of London, Fine, Richard Isaac, International and Comparative
Antitrust Law, 1967.
5
The most complete bibliography and report in this field occurs in 1964 Report of the
International Law Association's Tokyo Conference.
6
Cf. International Conference on the Control of Restrictive Practices in Chicago 1958,
the results of which are published by the Glencoe Press;
The International Conference on Restraints of Competition, Frankfurt on Main 1960,
found in Cartel and Monopoly and Modern Law;
The Table Ronde su la Tutela della Liberta di Concorrenza. which was held in Milano
1961 ; the official text of this conference may be found also in French;
Anti-Trust Laws a Comparative Symposium, N.Y. 1956, Published by Stevens, London
1956;
International Economic Association, Edited by E.H. Chamberlain, Macmillan, London;
St. Martins Press, N.Y. 1954;
Comparative Aspects of Anti-Trust Law in the U.S., U.K. and the E.E.C., I.C.L.Q.,
Supp. Pub. 6 1963.
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analysis of international legislation (i.e., treaties) and domestic legislation.
Such an analysis requires a merging of both international and comparative
law techniques. The result of the within analysis is the uncovering of the
basic concepts and their uniformity.
A.

The Substantive Restrictive PracticeDefined

At the outset the substance of a restrictive practice as well as its
underlying cause, must be determined. In determining the cause, the first
step is to determine the nature of the grouping which may be involved in a
restrictive practice. One such group is the industry which has grown
vertically or horizontally until it controls an entire market or segment
thereof. At that point it may decide to use this market control for its own
benefit.
A second group emerges from the banding together of many small
industries, or concentrations, or concentrations and small industries, each
of which is legally independent, to protect themselves against outside
competition or otherwise restrain competition.
The second step is to determine the relationship of the groups to each
other. This relationship may be either concerted or de facto, i.e., unconcerted.
Thus the construction of the restrictive practice may be:
1. Horizontalconcerted through the cartel or the entente;
2. Vertical concerted through the concentration;
3. Mixed concerted through combination of(l) and (2);
4. Mixed unconcerted through a combination which is de facto between
a concentration and a cartel, or all relationships below such in either
the horizontal or vertical areas.
Thus the groupings and their interrelationships are defined. The next
question becomes that of what do these groupings do to create a restrictive
practice, i.e., the purpose of the groupings. The purpose of the groupings
may be identical with the restrictive practice.
For the most part, the main types of restrictive practices may be divided
into general classifications:
1. Practices aimed at influencing prices or conditions of sale, purchase
or release, i.e., speculative schemes, concerted price fixing,
non-concerted price fixing, which is known as price leadership, price
differential arrangements, ancillary conditions.
2. The limitation of production and restriction of productive capacity or
of the number of varieties produced.
3. Market allocation which can be either territorial allocation or allocation of different lines of production.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
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4. Establishment of joint purchasing or sales or profit pooling arrangements.
5. Restrictions in matters of technological research, patents, etc.
6. Practices aimed at eliminating external competition, and
7. The combination of all the above in international trade, i.e., of
price-fixing arrangements, limitations of production through either
territorial market allocation, the establishment of joint sales, services
and profit pooling, restrictive practices in the field of technological
7
research and the elimination of outside competition.
Once the relationship and purpose of the groupings in restrictive business practices is described, the question of the effect of this relationship
upon the market arises. The viewpoint, i.e., legislation, of the particular
nations or regional organizations, is based on the opinions concerning the
effect of restrictive business practices and the various factors which determine their effectiveness. Thus it can be seen that a restrictive business
practice is of absolutely no interest unless it produces an effective result: it
is at the point of this effective result, that the legislation will begin.
Underlying legislation is the assumption by governments that laws intended to provide effective safeguards for free competition cannot be
limited to procedures alone. It is accordingly necessary to enact repressive
measures in order to eliminate undesirable factual practices.
In enacting the latter type of legislation, two basic attitudes reflecting
two different economic philosophies prevail. One attitude prefers to protect
free competition as such, with the idea that the nation must continue to
ensure this mainstay of its economic structure. Therefore, the nation will
prohibit restrictive practices irrespective of the harshness of the consequences.
The second attitude prefers to follow a neutral line, and attack those
effects of restrictive business practices which are determined to be harmful.
Many regional and national legislations, however, are inspired by both
principles. Thus, as will be seen in the "Summary," many nations change
their viewpoints, depending upon the factual restrictive practice.
The result of the legislative points of view may also be classified into
categories of (1) specific prohibition, (2) specific allowance, (3) general
prohibitions, (4) general allowance, and finally (5) no legislation at all. It is
amongst these five categories that the effects of any restrictive-practice
legislation lie.
7
The entire analysis of what is a restrictive practice in the viewpoint of the economists
may be found in Restrictive Business Practices, published by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, May 1959.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3

Control of Restrictive Business Practices

Thus on the basis of the relationship and purpose of the industrial units,
which become the categories of factual restrictive practices, whose effects
are tempered by legislation (dependent upon governmental policies) which
fall into five independent groupings, the remainder of this enquiry is based.

B. Outline ofAnalysis

International Restrictive-Practices legislation, is for the most part,
non-existent except in the European Coal & Steel Community, the European Common Market and some parts of the E.F.T.A., Comecon,
L.A.F.T.A. and C.A.C.M. Treaties. The above are classified "international" on the arbitrary basis that each results from an international
treaty. However, it should be noted that international treaties, such as the
above, are forming new nation-states in the "economic world." The restrictive-practice laws of international organizations will be compared with the
individual countries giving a regional customary law.
The five basic structures of restrictive business practices mentioned
earlier may be analysed under fourteen sub-categories: (1) horizontal price
fixing, (2) vertical price fixing, (3) allocation or division of markets, (4)
export cartels, (5) import cartels, (6) boycotts, (7) joint ventures, (8) market
dominating enterprises, (9) monopoly or monopolizing, (10) merger or
consolidation, (11) price discrimination, (12) discriminatory terms of sale,
(13) exclusive dealing and (14) refusal to sell. 8
Through the above analysis, the construction of the "international"
anti-trust law of the European Coal & Steel Community, the European
Common Market, the European Free Trade Association, the Latin American. Free Trade Area, the Central American Common Market, and Comecon may be linked to a comparison of the legislation of the countries of the
respective geographical areas, which will demonstrate that the uniform
substantive nature of anti-trust law:
a. exists
b. exists as a viable element of a customary international law, and
c. exists as an area in which control may easily be implemented.
It is the suggestion of this proposal, that a treaty may be created without
any of the "nations" moving markedly from their avowed positions of
legislation.

8
Definition of these terms is arbitrarily designated to be the same as those used by the
OECD.
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Part II. Attempts Since 1945 To Achieve International Control of
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade
A Summary
As a natural reaction against the excesses of nationalism in the economic
field, which accompanied and followed the great depression of the '30s, a
general desire for international economic cooperation became apparent
after the Second World War. Attempts were made to find an international
solution to the problem of restrictive business practices in international
trade. The Havana Charter was the first attempt in this direction, and was
to cover all aspects of economic relations between nations.
The Havana Charter was not adopted in its original form. However, it
did inspire a shorter instrument in the form of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter, which refers to
restrictive business practices, was dropped in the process of the formation
of the G.A.T.T. Nevertheless the basic ideas incorporated in Chapter 5
have had a considerable impact on all subsequent international agreements
or draft agreements dealing in this area. This was particularly the case in a
draft prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices, established by the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations.
In its introductory remarks the Committee recognized the validity of the
three basic postulates of Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter, namely:
1. that restrictive business practices affecting international trade can in
some circumstances have harmful effects on the achievement of
generally acceptable objectives of international commercial policy;
2. that in such a situation it would be difficult for states acting individually to take appropriate measures; and
3. that the difficulty of setting up international control arises mainly
from the divergency of opinions held on the problem in different
countries.
Under these circumstances the Ad Hoc Committee's draft offered a
compromise formula very similar to that of Chapter 5, which, isolated as it
is from other problems of international economic activity, has not so far
aroused sufficient positive interest to be put into effect.
Although stagnant at the international level, endeavours to achieve international action in the field of restrictive practices affecting international
trade, have been focused on achieving regional solutions in Europe. The
Council of Europe had prepared a draft at the time the Ad Hoc Committee
of the United Nations was initiating its work. Then followed a period of
practical achievements with relevant provisions of the Treaty instituting
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
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the European Coal & Steel Community and the Treaty of Rome. The hope
of finding a solution on a larger scale has not been abandoned, and on
several occasions in recent years the problem has come up for consideration by the contracting parties to G.A.T.T.
A. Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter
It should be stressed that the provisions relating to restrictive business
practices contained in Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter, were only destined to function as part of the Charter which was intended to cover the
whole field of trade and employment problems in international economic
life. This is why Chapter 5 sometimes refers to other provisions of the
Charter.
1.THE RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN THE CHARTER
With respect to the initiators of restrictive business practices, the Charter takes into consideration practices which are engaged in or made
effective by one or more private or public or commercial enterprises, or by
any combination or any other arrangement between any such enterprises,
whenever such commercial ventures individually or collectively possess
effective control of trade among a number of countries. 9
The definition seems to cover all possible cases of industry concentration, cartels or non-concerted restrictions engaged in by several enterprises.
With respect to the business practices themselves, the Charter first gives
the definition outlined earlier which indicates that such practices restrain
competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control. The
Charter specified its intention to prevent practices only whenever such
practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade, or
interfere with the achievement of any of the objectives set forth in Article 1
of the Charter. 10 Article I of the Charter set forth the general purposes of
the Havana Charter.
The list of restrictive practices in their particular aspect was given in
Article 46 paragraphs 3(a)-(f).
"Paragraph (a). Fixing prices or terms or conditions to be observed in
dealing with others in the purchase, sale or lease of any product.
Paragraph (b). Excluding enterprises from or allocating or dividing any
territory or market or field of business activity or allocating customers,
fixing sales or purchase quotas.
9

Article 46, paragraph 2(b) and (c).
'°Article 46, paragraph 1.
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Paragraph (c). Discriminating against particular enterprises.
Paragraph (d). Limiting production or limiting production quotas.
Paragraph (e). Preventing by agreement the development or application
of technology or invention whether patented or unpatented.
Paragraph (f). Extending the use of rights under patents, trade marks or
copyrights granted by a member, to matters which according to its laws
and regulations are not within the scope of such grants, or to products or
conditions of production, use or sale which are likewise not the subject of
such grants."' 1
However, the list is not strictly limited as shown by the inclusion of a
final item as follows:
Any similar practices which the organization may declare by a majority
of
12
2/3rds of the members present voting to be restrictive business practices.
It can therefore be seen that if new types of restrictive business practices develop, the members of the International Trade Organization could
include them in the prohibited practices.
2. METHODS USED TO CONTROL THE HARMFUL PRACTICES
IN PARTICULAR CASES
Chapter 5 provided for procedures applicable in "particular cases" and
for general measures where the trade in goods is affected. For the application of both it relied largely on the Organization which meant the International Trade Organization. The Charter did not specify any specialized body to deal with restrictive business practices.
Two sets of procedures were applicable in the "particular cases."
(a) The consultation procedure, operated under paragraph I of Article
46, was open only to an affected member state which considered that a
practice existed which has or is about to have a damaging effect,
indicated in that paragraph. In the case of complaints against a public
commercial enterprise acting independently, or any other enterprise, a
member may set the investigation procedure in motion, only after the
member has resorted to consultation procedure outlined in Article 28,
paragraph 1. However, in other cases, the affected member was free to
resort to either the consultation or to the investigation procedure, but
the fact that he has recourse to the consultation procedure would not
preclude the possibility of investigation being initiated. The affected
member may consult other members directly or request the Organ"The list corresponds closely, except for a few explanatory details, to the description
which was given as the main types of restrictive business practices earlier in the Introduction.
12
Article 46, paragraph 3(g).
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
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ization to arrange for consultation with particular members, with a view
to reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions. If the Organization is
requested to arrange for consultation, it shall do so only if it considers
3
such action to be justified.'
(b) The second was the investigation procedure. It was obviously the
more far-reaching and more important of the two procedures outlined
in Chapter 5. It dealt with the admissibility of complaints, which were
presented to the Organization in writing under Article 48, Paragraph 1,
upon which the Organization must decide whether an investigation is
justified under Article 48, paragraph 3. The decision of justification
however, did not entirely rest with the Organization. Under Article 46,
paragraph 2, complaints were subject to investigation when they concerned practices originating in the manner described in the first section
of Chapter 5, or when the practices fall within one of the categories
listed in paragraph 3, Article 46.
The Organization would inform all members of the complaint, and may
request any member to furnish any such additional information as the
Organization deems necessary. However, in Article 50, paragraph 3 (concerning the obligations of the member states), the following caveat appears:
... provided that any member on notification to the Organization may withhold information which the member considers is not essential to the Organization in conducting an adequate investigation and which if disclosed would
substantially damage the legitimate business interests of a commercial enterprise.
Thus an "out" exists for the members. However, this "out" is somewhat
narrowed by:
(1) the obligation imposed upon the members giving such notification to
indicate the general character of the information withheld, and the
reason why it is considered to be non-essential; and
(2) The Organization conducting or arranging for hearings of the complaint under Article 48, paragraph 4, under which everyone has a
right to a fair hearing.
3. THE CONCLUSIONS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVESTIGATION
The Organization decides whether the conditions that justify an investigation are present, and also whether the practice in question has had,
or is about to have, harmful effects under Article 48, paragraph 5. Under
paragraph 6 of that Article, it informs all members of its decision and the
reasons therefor. If the Organization does decide that the above-mentioned
"3 Article 47.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
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conditions are present, it requires the member state to take every possible
remedial action, and may also recommend to the member concerned remedial measures to be carried out in accordance with their laws and procedures under Article 48, paragraph 7.
It may also request any member to report fully on the remedial action it
14
has taken in any particular case.
It is therefore seen that the Organization has no means of direct action,
but must act through the members who have undertaken under Article 50,
para. 4, to take full account of its recommendations. It should be noted that
two important qualifications exist to this undertaking:
1. it is tempered by the slightly ambigious clause which provides that
each member shall take such action in the particular case as it
considers appropriate in accordance with its constitution or system of
law.
2. it is accompanied by what seems to be a superfluous precaution in
Article 50, paragraph 5, which stated that when a member does not
take action on the recommendation of the Organization, it shall inform the Organization of the reasons therefore and discuss the matter
further with the Organization if it so requests.
In these latter circumstances, the most effective means of pressure
placed in the hands of the Organization under Chapter 5, may be the
publication of a report showing fully the decisions reached, the reasons
therefore and any measures recommended to the members concerned,
notwithstanding the reservation that if a member so requests, the Organization shall not publish confidential information furnished by that member,
which if disclosed will substantially damage the legitimate business interests of a commercial enterprise. 15
In fact, a comparison of the report with the information published
concerning the measures actually taken by the members, would enable
public opinion to appreciate the extent to which the members are prepared
to comply with the Organization's recommendations.
In the area of procedures with respect to services (contra the above
procedures affecting trade in goods), the powers of the Organization are
considerably less. The only remedy open to members is the consultation
procedure. A member which considers that restrictive business practices
exist in relation to a service which have, or are about to have, harmful
effects, may submit a written statement explaining the situation to the
member or members, whose private or public enterprises are engaged in
the service in question. The member or members concerned shall afford
14Article 48, paragraph 8.
15
Article 48, paragraph 9.
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opportunity for consultation with a view to effecting a satisfactory adjust16
ment.
If no adjustment can be effected under this procedure, and if the matter
is referred to the Organization, it shall be transferred to the appropriate
intergovernmental organization, if one exists, with which observations as
the Organization may wish to make. If no such intergovernmental organization exists, and if members so request, the Organization may make
recommendations, not because it has received any specific authority in this
matter, but by virtue of the very broad functions entrusted to it under
Chapter 7 of the Charter, which lists the functions to be performed by the
1 7
Organization.
4. GENERAL MEANS OF CONTROLLING
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES
Finally, the general means of controlling restrictive business practices
are of such a nature that Chapter 5 relies on the internal legislation of the
members, on their concerted action, on studies carried out by the Organization, and on the widest cooperation with intergovernmental organizations to supplement the results of the procedures laid down for the
"particular cases."
Independent of the cooperation that each member is to give to the
Organization for its consideration and investigation of complaints, each
member is committed to take, of its own accord, all possible measures in
accordance with its constitution, system of law and economic organization
to ensure within its jurisdiction, that private and public commercial enterprises do not engage in practices affecting international trade which have
harmful effects.' 8
However, it should be observed that while Chapter 5 of the Charter
encourages members to use their legislative weapons against harmful practices, it reserves their right of jurisdiction in that it stipulates that no act, or
omission to act, on the part of the Organization, shall preclude any
member from enforcing any national statute or decree directly toward
preventing monopoly or restraint of trade.' 9
The above clause would seem to authorize a member to take measures
by virtue of its legislation, against enterprises located in other countries
which engage in restrictive practices disclosed in Chapter 5, and not
directly affecting its own market.
6
M
Article
17Article
"8Article
19Article

52, paragraph 2.
52, paragraph 3.
50, paragraph I.
52.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

646

Another reservation in the opposite direction covers the rights and
obligations of members set forth in Chapters of the Charter, other than
Chapter 5. Examples of this are trade engaged in by state or in20
tergovernmental agreements on primary commodities.
In addition, members may cooperate with each other with the purpose of
making more effective within their respective jurisdictions, any remedial
measures taken under Chapter 5.21 The Organization is authorized to make
recommendations to members presumably as a result of its studies, which
will be dealt with thereinafter concerning conventions and laws which
22
relate to restrictive business practices.
The Organization may conduct studies either on its own initiative, or at
the request of any member, or of any organ of the United Nations, or any
other intergovernmental organization. Such studies relate to general aspects of restrictive business practices affecting trade, and to any conventions, laws or procedures in so far as they are relevant to such prac23
tices.
The cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations under Article 53, paragraph 4, is not more than the application, in the field of
restrictive practices, of a general principle of cooperation laid down in
Chapter 7, which sets forth the functions of the International Trade Organization.
B. U.N. Ad Hoc Committee
The second treaty attempt in the restrictive business practices area, was
the Draft Articles of Agreement proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee on
Restrictive Business Practices of ECOSOC. When it became apparent that
the Havana Charter would not be implemented, the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations took upon itself the task of examining the
problem of restrictive business practices in international
trade.
In September 1952, the Council adopted a resolution, No. 375, instructing an Ad Hoc Committee to prepare and submit proposals, on
methods to be adopted for supplementing one of its recommendations
which stated "members of the United Nations take appropriate measures
and cooperate with one another with a view to achieving the objectives laid
down in Article 46, paragraph I of Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter."
The Council had clearly indicated that the methods to be proposed were
to be based on the principles set forth in Chapter 5 of the Charter. The
20

Article
Article
22
Article
23
Article
21

54,
51,
49,
49,

paragraph
paragraph
paragraph
paragraph

I.
I.
2(a).
1.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3

Control of Restrictive Business Practices

Draft Articles of Agreement prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee, were
submitted to the Sixteenth Session of the Council in July 1953. As the
Council could not reach general agreement on the draft, it was decided at
the Nineteenth Session in May 1955, that the examination of the question
would be temporarily suspended; and it remains so at present.
In accordance with the Council's wishes, the substantive provisions of
the draft followed very closely, except for a few points which will be
exemplified, those of Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter. The organizational
provisions however, introduced new innovations which were quite understandable, considering that the function of the International Trade Organization which was to be charged with the task of implementing Chapter 5,
were commensurate with the scope of various matters coming under the
Charter, whereas the Ad Hoc Committee was concerned only with an
agency, whose functions were to be limited to the special problem of
restrictive business practices.
1. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF
THE DRAFT ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

a. Restrictive Business PracticesConcerned
With respect to enterprises which engaged in restrictive business practices the draft closely followed Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter. However, concerning the practices themselves, two alterations took place.
First, in evaluating harmful effects, Chapter 5 referred to Article 1 of the
Havana Charter.
To replace this Article, the Committee affixed a preamble to the text of
the Draft Articles, setting forth general objectives inspired by those of
Article 1 of the Charter. Defining in greater detail the scope of the preamble, the Ad Hoc Committee said in its report that the purpose of listing
the series of objectives was to ensure full examination of pertinent issues,
not to enforce an analysis of every point in the list regardless of its
relevance.
The second alteration was the list of restrictive business practices which
represented a substantial change according to Article 1, paragraph 3,
sub-paragraph (e) of the Draft, as compared with the corresponding Charter provisions, which referred only to practices preventing by agreement
the development or application of technology or inventions whether patented or unpatented. The Ad Hoc Committee considered this formula too
narrow as it did not cover the case of restrictive practices engaged in by an
industrial concentration.
It therefore added to the text of this paragraph a sentence, covering
practices preventing by coercion the development or application of techInternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
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nology, or withholding the application of such technology with the result of
monopolizing the industrial or commercial field. Even so, according to the
Draft, suppression of technology by a concentration is taken into account
only when the latter imposes its will on one or more enterprises and the
restraint leads to a monopoly.
b. Methods Used in the Control of Harmful Practices
in ParticularCases.

Once again two procedures were available:
(a) the consultation procedure, and
(b) the investigation procedure.
In the consultation procedure the Committee did nothing to alter the
procedure. Under the investigation procedure the admissibility of complaints followed the example of Article 54 of the I.T.O. Treaty.
In that procedure only a minor modification took place and that was the
elimination of the reference to hearings that existed in the Organization.
With respect to the special procedures in the area of services, the only
major change was the replacement of the expression that its interests are
thereby seriously prejudiced, as a previous requirement for members to
submit a statement to the Organization by the milder phrase that its
interests are thereby adversely affected.
c. General Means of Controlling Restrictive Business Practices

In this area, the Committee expanded on the Organization's viewpoint of
who was to be consulted, and it allowed organizations such as the European Coal & Steel Community to be treated as a nation-state with
respect to consultation procedures. Thus the European Coal & Steel Community achieved the status of a nation, economically speaking.
And finally in the area of organizational provisions, the Ad Hoc Committee set forth the suggestion of the possibility of a permanent secretariat
to deal with these complaints, ultimately using a consultation procedure
amongst the member governments, and a staff composed of delegates of all
the member governments. However, this was never finally approved. Thus,
it is seen that the Ad Hoc Committee's draft at the present time is nothing
more than history.
C. Council of Europe

The third draft, which was being formulated at the same time, but which
differed very much from the Havana Charter and the Draft of the Ad Hoc
Committee, was the Draft of the Council of Europe. As early as 1949 the
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe requested its Committee
of Ministers to draw up a draft European Convention for the control of
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3
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international cartels. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe
undertook the study in question in consultation with the OEEC.
In March 1951 a report draft convention was submitted for examination
and comments by member governments of the Council of Europe. However, noting that the ECOSOC was concerned with the same question and
in order to avoid any overlapping, the Committee of Ministers instructed
the Secretary General to keep in close touch with the activities thus
undertaken at the international level.
With the report of restrictive business practices presented to ECOSOC
by the Ad Hoc Committee in July 1953, the Council of Europe, as an
interested intergovernmental organization, in an opinion, No. 10 of 23rd
September 1954, reaffirmed its views concerning the need to deal adequately with restrictive business practices, which have a harmful effect on
international trade, and expressed the conviction that the draft agreement
drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee seemed to represent those minimum
standards of any agreement in this field, to which a larger number of
countries could agree.
D. GA.T.T.

The final group to consider restrictive business practices at the full
international level was that of the G.A.T.T. In 1954 the governments of
Denmark, Norway and Sweden expressed to the Contracting Parties their
opinion that the forthcoming review of the General Agreement, would
afford the opportunity of examining the possibility of inserting provisions
relating to restrictive business practices.
They proposed taking as a basis for discussion the draft of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the ECOSOC. In the same year the government of the
Federal Republic of Germany embodied suggestions along the same line, in
a draft which was largely inspired by that of the Ad Hoc Committee, but
which differed from it on one important point. Whereas the ECOSOC draft
left to member states an option between the consultation and the investigation procedures, the German draft provided that a member presenting a complaint should first be required to resort to the consultation
procedure, and only if that failed could the investigation procedure take
place. In short, the German proposal was exactly the reverse of the
amendment of the text of Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter by the Ad Hoc
Committee's draft.
At the review session the Contracting Parties examined the question of
whether G.A.T.T. should have direct responsibility for the implementation
of the Draft Articles of Agreement on Restrictive Practices submitted to
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the ECOSOC by the Ad Hoc Committee. They decided to postpone
further consideration of the question pending the outcome of the ECOSOC
discussions. At the Tenth Session, 1955, the postponement was again
suggested as the ECOSOC had not reached an agreement.
In 1956, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and
Norway submitted new proposals to the Eleventh Session of the Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties referred the German and Norwegian proposals to the Intercessional Committee with instructions to submit
a report and recommendations to the Twelfth Session.
In conformity with its terms of reference, the Intercessional Committee
in 1957 invited the Contracting Parties to submit proposals for consideration at its September meeting. Complying with this request the Norwegian government submitted an explanatory memorandum, together with a
draft supplementary agreement to the General Agreement.
At the Twelfth Session of the Contracting Parties the Norwegian government again put forward its proposals to appoint a working party, and
suggested that the Contracting Parties should study the matter at their
Fourteenth Session on the basis of the report of the working party. Finally,
the Contracting Parties instructed the Secretariat to collect and analyse
documentation on restrictive practices and to submit it to the next meeting
of the Intercessional Committee. The Committee was to decide whether it
should establish a working party or a group of experts.
In 1950 in the Basic Instruments, 7th September, page 27 and page 28, a
committee for restrictive practices was appointed. 24 In the Ninth Supplement of the Basic Instruments 1961, page 28, and the decision of 18th
November 1960, the ultimate suggestion to the countries to discuss anti
trust was made. The report of the 1958 committee appointing a commission to act was read, and related documents were set forth. 25
As a final note to this section, it should be stated that the Council of
Ministers of the OECD recommended to its Member governments on 5th
October 1967, that they should voluntarily cooperate within the confines of
their laws and interests with other members with respect to restrictive
business practices affecting international trade. (Recommendation of the
Council concerning cooperation between member countries on restrictive
business practices affecting international trade-adopted by the Council at
its 149th meeting, 5 October, 1967-Switzerland abstained.
24

Resolution of 5th November 1958.
25The documents were No. L/1287 of 12th September 1960, which is the Norwegian
proposal; L/1301 of 13th October 1960, which is New Zealand, Sweden, United States and
Germany, calling for a world organization; L/3333, 1st November 1960, which is the proposal
of the Japanese Government, and N. 17/23 and 37, 15th November 1960, where the chairman
disallowed all of the proposals for the world organization.
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In the regional organizations on the other hand, and particularly in the
European Coal & Steel Community, the viewpoints of supernationality
versus consultation procedure, the type of organizations that should be set
up to control restrictive practices questions, prior registration versus
"chasing" are uncovered, and may be seen to present the viable alternative
by which restrictive practices can be controlled.
The substantive restrictive practices which are controlled by the international regional organizations, are the same as those which were defined earlier in the Introduction, and also those which were intended to be
controlled both by the I.T.O., by the Ad Hoc Committee, the Council of
Europe and the G.A.T.T. As will be seen in the next section, the time may
be near once again to attempt an international control of restrictive practices, either using as a basis the I.T.O. Charter, or possibly a newly worded
charter, directed toward the same basic ideas. Even if formalistic international control will not take place, or is not desired at the present time
for political reasons, it is contended that, through international customary
law, control does exist, and may not be ignored by the individual trader
even if it be by the official government.
Part III. Summary of Substantive Restrictive
Practices Legislation
In the introduction to this proposal the theory was advanced that legislative uniformity exists at the substantive level of the domestic and organizational regulations, if the legislation be analysed under a categorization
of factual occurence. In constructing the categorization, the first step was
to determine the nature of the grouping which may be involved in a factual
restrictive practice.
One type of grouping may be the industry which has grown vertically or
horizontally, until it controls the entire market or a segment thereof. At
that point the industry may decide to use this market control for its own
benefit. A second type of grouping may emerge from a banding together of
many small industries, or of concentrations, or concentrations and small
industries. It should be noted that each of these groupings may be legally
and internally independent of each other. Upon the above groupings, the
factual restrictive practice is constructed. The restrictive practice may be:
1. Horizontal
2. Vertical
3. Mixed and concerted through a combination of 1 and 2, and
4. Mixed and unconcerted through a combination of 1 and 2.
The second step was to determine whether these groupings accomplished the creation of a factual restrictive practice, i.e., what are the
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purposes of these groupings. They may be identical to the factual restrictive practices. The general types of factual restrictive practices number
seven. In the seven general factual restrictive practices, not only the
purpose but also the identity of the restrictive practice was identified. The
general factual restricted practices are:
1. Practices aimed at influencing prices or conditions of sale, purchase
or release;
2. The limitation of production and restriction of productive capacity or
the number of varieties produced;
3. Market allocation, either territorial or production;
4. Establishment of joint purchasing, or sales, or profit pooling arrangements;
5. Restrictions in matters of technological research;
6. Practices aimed at eliminating external competition; and
7. A combination of all of the above in the international sphere.
Under these seven relationships and definitions of the restrictive practice comes the ultimate criterion of the restrictive practice, that of effect. It
is at this level that the legislation begins to act. The legislation, itself, is not
aimed at the identity of the restrictive practice, but the effect thereof.
In enacting the legislation, two basic attitudes seemed to exist within the
countries. The first attitude preferred to protect a "free competition" and
thus prohibit all types of factual restrictive practices per se as an attempt to
prohibit the effects of the above restrictive practices (Cf.U.S. Law).
The second attitude preferred to follow a more neutral policy, and attack
only those "harmful" effects of the factual restrictive practices. Thus a
restriction occurred only if those factual restrictive practices which the
legislature determines to have the aforementioned "harmful effect."
The fourteen specific sub-categories mentioned earlier have been
analysed with the object of isolating the point, at which the two aforementioned political philosophies react against the effect of the factual restrictive practices, and determine which factual restrictive practices are to be
prohibited or not prohibited. The above determinations construct the foundation necessary for the resolution of both the procedural (i.e., extra-territorial) and substantive conflicts existing in restrictive practice legis26
lation.
26

1t should be noted that a summary of the anti-trust laws of the world can be found in
the United Nations Restrictive Practice Reports, which was an analysis collected by the
Secretariat at the United Nations, on the request of the Economic and Social Council in 1953
and 54. It is entitled Restrictive Business Practices Annexes, Official Records of the Sixteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council, Supplement No.I lb, and Restrictive
Business Practices Report on Current Legal Developments in the Field of Restrictive Business Practices, Official Record of the Nineteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council,
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Category 1.:
HorizontalPrice-Fixing

In the North Atlantic area and the Commonwealth, a customary law
exists which prohibits horizontal price-fixing, except in the specialized
circumstances which require a special dispensation. In the Latin American

countries horizontal price-fixing is prohibited, either under constitutional
amendments or through special laws (Cf. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico).
The Far Eastern and Middle Eastern countries, for the most part, other
than Japan, Isreal and Turkey, allow horizontal price-fixing. In each of the

latter three countries it is prohibited under legislation; however, it may be
allowed with certain exceptions.
In the Eastern European countries horizontal price-fixing is combined
with vertical price-fixing and price discrimination. Prices are fixed by the
state, so that no question of price-fixing in the western sense arises.
However, certain products are protected by price regulations. Even though

price-fixing per se does not exist, the price regulations do ensure that no
"illegal" type of activity (illegal in the sense used in the west) occurs in the
Eastern European countries. Contra to the Eastern European countries is
Yugoslavia, which has a western price-fixing system specifically prohibiting

any agreements on prices. So it may be said that for all countries analysed,
horizontal price-fixing is prohibited unless specifically allowed.
Category 2: Vertical Price-fixing

As in the horizontal price-fixing category, the general rule for vertical
price-fixing is that of prohibition. However, specific exceptions are more
numerous, for in the vertical price fixing category is the exception of resale
price maintenance. The North Atlantic countries and Commonwealth, although adopting a prohibition basis, allow resale price maintenance in
many instances, in which it is felt to benefit the society.
The Eastern European countries place vertical price-fixing under the
same control used for the horizontal price-fixing category (Cf. above).
The Latin American countries have the general prohibition within their
Supplement No.3. However, due to the fact that this was completed in 1954, at the present
time it is found to be primarily outdated. There has been no other intensive study in the area.
However, with respect to the North Atlantic Community and Japan, the O.E.C.D. has
constructed a Guide to Restrictive Business Practice Legislation, and in 1964 a Comparative
Summary of Legislation in Europe and North America, which was a working document.
These two documents have been of the utmost aid to the author in comparing the restrictive
business practices of the member countries. The author has primarily used the documents as a
basis to begin an analysis at a point at which the documents were concluded. The laws of the
Latin American, Eastern European Commonwealth, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern may be
found in U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopolies, Report 1965, appendix 1.A detailed analysis of all of the laws in this section, in
addition to a full bibliography, may be found in the thesis mentioned in footnote 4 on which
this "proposal" is based. Accordingly, extensive footnotes will be omitted from this section.
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constitutions or special laws. However, the criterion of societal benefit
allows resale price maintenance. The societal benefit criterion is also found
in Japan, Israel and Turkey, while in the remainder of the Far and Middle
East no specific prohibition exists. Thus the customary law in the vertical
price-fixing category is that of prohibition with resale price maintenance
being allowed in specified cases of societal benefit.
Category 3: Allocation or Division of Markets
In the Latin American countries, allocation and division of markets are
disallowed by the constitutions or the specified laws mentioned earlier in
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia specifically
prohibits such conduct, while the other countries do not have the problem
due to state control.
In the North Atlantic countries and the Commonwealth, the allocation
or division of markets is prohibited in every country under the general
legislation or under specialized legislation. The same situation exists in
Japan, Israel and Turkey. However, the criterion of societal benefit may
control, and in some countries such as Austria, agreements are allowed
provided they are duly entered in the Cartel Register. Accordingly prohibition, with the exemption of societal benefit, is the customary law.
Category 4: Export Cartels
Export cartels receive the greatest amount of legislative attention in the
North Atlantic area, in which the export cartel is allowed unless an effect
upon trade within the particular nation exists. With the exception of Japan
which specifically allows the export cartel, no legislation exists in the Latin
American countries, in the Middle East, Far Eastern countries or in the
Eastern European countries, for this type of cartel.
Category 5: Import Cartels
The import cartel will be controlled under a criterion of the effect upon
competition within the particular state. The import cartel is allowed unless
its effect is unduly detrimental to the welfare of the country. The North
Atlantic Community, the Commonwealth and Israel have the same criterion to determine the incidence of the cartel, i.e., the effect upon competition within the state.
In Latin America, the import cartel is not specifically prohibited; in the
Middle East and Far East with the exception of Japan, no legislation exists.
Japan has legislation specifically on the import cartel. In Eastern Europe
no legislation exists with respect to the import cartel. Thus, in summary,
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the import cartel will be allowed, provided that it does not have a detrimental effect on the economy of the legislating nation.
Category 6: The Boycott

The boycott presents a more unique problem with respect to customary
international law. On the domestic level, in the North Atlantic area and the
Commonwealth, the boycott is forbidden provided it is either discriminatory, or without a good economic purpose. Thus boycotts are prohibited under the criterion of the economic good of the country, or the
existence of an abusive economic practice.
In Eastern Europe, legislation exists in Bulgaria, which prohibits private
associations and monopolistic agreements, in which a boycott might be
included. In Yugoslavia, an article with respect to the unjustified refusal to
conclude a contract for sale, or for other commercial reasons, and an
article which prohibits economic organizations from acting without principles of good faith, mutual trust and cooperation, exists. Thus the criteria
which exist in the North Atlantic boycott legislation also are the criteria of
the legislation of the Eastern European countries.
In the Latin American countries the boycott is specifically prohibited as
it is in Japan, Israel and under the general principles of law of the other Far
Eastern and Middle Eastern countries.
A problem develops with respect to boycott in international law. This
problem is best exemplified by the Chinese boycotts which occurred earlier
in this century. The issue may best be stated in the following form: does
any international law responsibility attach to the particular country in
which boycott takes place, especially if the boycott is of foreign goods.
The questions are of a dual nature. The first is state responsibility for
acts, other than governmental acts, which are injurious to foreign powers;
the second is state responsibility for hostile propaganda against foreign
powers. 2 7 In the viewpoint of Lauterpacht, 28 guilt may not be placed upon
the state if a private enterprise within the state is conducting the boycott.
On the other hand, if the particular government happens to lend official
support to the boycott, the question becomes slightly more difficult. The
American viewpoints 29 differ from Lauterpacht in the instance of a government and a political party, such as the government and the Communist
27A number of articles have discussed these questions: see LAUTERPACHT,

BRITISH

YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1933, pages 125- 140; PREUss, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1934, page 667; and BOUVE, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 281934, page 29, ff.
See note 27.
29
1d.
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party of an Eastern European country, both being involved in a boycott as
against only the consumer.
The American viewpoint is as follows: a boycott in a country where a
political party which is close to the Government does control the market
area, may bring the charge of a breach of international law upon the
government of the nation. However, the above viewpoint has not been
established in international law at the present time. It was suggested with
respect to the Chinese boycotts.3 0 However, this view has never been
established as the major view of the problem.
In summary, it may be concluded in the domestic legislation, that the
boycott which is of a malicious or an abusive nature is prohibited.
Category 7: The Joint Venture
In none of the countries is the joint venture per se specifically prohibited. However, the effects of a joint venture such as monopolising or an
abuse of a dominant position, may be prohibited. Thus, the joint venture
does not have a prohibitive category for its own.
Category 8: The Market-DominatingEnterprise
In this category it is not the market-dominating enterprise which is
prohibited, but the abuse of the market-dominating position. This was
found to be the case in the entire North Atlantic area, and the Commonwealth.
In the United States not only the abuse of the market-dominating position is prohibited, but the gaining of such a position through unnatural
growth is also prohibited.
In the Latin American countries the prohibition is contained in constitutions or special laws. In the Far East no prohibition other than the
abuse of dominant position exists. The Middle East has no legislation other
than that of Israel which does prohibit the abuse of the market-dominating
position.
In Eastern Europe no abuse of the market-dominating position may
occur, due to the state controlled nature of the market.
In summary, it is the abuse of the market-dominating position which is
outlawed under domestic legislation.
Category 9: Monoply or Monopolizing
The North Atlantic and Commonwealth customary law could be established to display that the non-state-allowed monopoly is theoretically pro30

Cf., PREUSS and BoUVE, supra. note 27.
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hibited. In the USSR, private monopolisitc organizations are prohibited. In
Latin America, monopoly is prohibited by the constitution. In Japan, other
Far Eastern countries and Israel, monopolies are prohibited.
The allowance of monopolistic position by a particular state is found to
exist under the criterion of a societal benefit. The Yugoslavian law extends
the prohibition of monopolies to local self-governing authorities, which
attempt to create monopolistic positions or enterprises within their own
territories, which do not in the opinion of the state benefit society. Thus,
uniformity exists in the factual situations of allowance of a monopoly and
the criteria necessary to attain such allowance.
Category 10: Mergers

The merger, itself, is not prohibited, but the merger which causes undesirable effects will be prohibited in all of the countries without state controlled economies. In the other countries, since the merger is state controlled, no need exists for a prohibition of its effects.
In summary, the legislation will prohibit all mergers whose effects do not
benefit society.
Category 11: Price Discrimination

Price discrimination in the Eastern European countries, as mentioned
earlier with respect to both horizontal and vertical price-fixing, is prohibited in the administrative rules or the penal code. Civil law rules in Yugoslavia prohibit agreements on price.
In the Latin American countries, price discrimination is prohibited by
the statute or by constitution.
In the North Atlantic countries, the Commonwealth, Japan and Israel
the price discrimination prohibited is of a predatory nature.
A caveat should be mentioned in the United States, in which any type of
lowering of a price, unless justified by the guilty corporation or organization, is considered to be of a predatory nature. This predatory criterion
is of an objective nature, and the factual situation seems to be the same in
all countries.
Category 12: Discriminatory Terms of Sale

Reference may be made to the boycott category in which the same
legislation covers the discriminatory terms of sale and boycott. This is the
situation in Eastern Europe. In Latin America, the question is once again
covered by the constitutions and the specific statues of the countries.
In the North Atlantic area, the Commonwealth, Japan, Turkey and
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Israel, a discrimination will not be allowed unless an objective criterion can
be put forth to show the rationale of the discrimination, and that the society
ultimately does benefit from the discrimination.
Category 13: Exclusive Dealing

Exclusive dealing contracts will be allowed unless an abuse of the
competitive structure can be proven. This is the law in the North Atlantic
area and the Commonwealth. In Eastern Europe no law exists in the
exclusive-dealing category due to the nature of the market.
In the Latin American area, exclusive dealing is per se prohibited, if the
abuse to competition were shown to exist as in all other abuses under the
criteria of the constitutions and statutes. In Japan, Turkey and Israel,
exclusive dealing is prohibited unless it falls within the accepted criteria of
societal benefit.
The abuse of competitive structure may be equated with the criteria of
prohibition, thus giving a uniform law in this category.
Category 14: Refusal to Sell

A refusal to sell falls into the same sphere of legislative analysis, as that
of the boycott. It may be concluded that a refusal to sell is prohibited in all
countries of the North Atlantic area and Commonwealth, unless a very
good reason for the refusal having societal benefit is shown.
The Eastern European countries deal with the refusal to sell in the same
legislation as used for boycotts and discriminatory terms of sale.
In the Latin American countries it is prohibited by constitution and the
statute. In the Far East the refusal to sell is prohibited in Japan; it is also
prohibited in Israel and Turkey. Thus, refusal to sell unless shown to be
.based on an objective rationale with societal benefit is prohibited in all
countries.
Summary

From the above it may now be concluded that an international customary law of restrictive practice legislation, based on the effect of factual
restrictive practices, does exist today in the fourteen aforementioned categories.
Factual restrictive practices are prohibited in all instances in which a
societal benefit does not offset the effect of the restrictive practice. This
was noted especially in the legislation of the Eastern European countries,
in which the factual restrictive practice was frequently prohibited in criminal codes. In countries and organizations which prohibit the effect of
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factual restrictive practices ab initio, a specific exemption is made for the
societal benefit (Cf., Art. 85(3) Treaty of Rome).
Supplementary legislation may be enacted allowing the exemption of
societal benefit in certain instances (Cf., Japan), or the original legislation
may not be adequately enforced to prohibit the practice, if a societal benefit
is thought to exist. (Cf., the Latin American countries.) As may have been
noticed, the effect of a factual restrictive practice which was thought to
contain societal benefit, was identical in all countries regardless of the
nature of legislation of the country (i.e.,specifically prohibitive, etc.).
The same identity occurred with respect to the effects of those restrictive practices which were considered to have "harmful effects." Thus,
under the fourteen categories explored, whether the harmful affect controlled, or the underlying legislative prohibition was emasculated by the
exemption of "societal benefit," uniformity remained in the specific factual
situations regardless of the five effects of the legislation (i.e., specific
prohibition, general prohibition etc.).
It may accordingly be concluded the substantive factual uniformity exists with respect to the practical effects of restrictive trade practice legislation. If the above individual effects of domestic legislation be accepted as
state practice, an international customary law of restrictive-practice legislation may be concluded to exist in the analysed categories.

The substantive uniformity having been identified, the question for the
future is whether the newly defined customary international law should be
formalized in either:
(1) bilateral or multi-lateral agreements to arbitrate disputes with respect to the effects of factual restrictive practices; or
(2) a formal treaty which would encompass the arbitration agreements.
The negative aspect of this question implies either:
(i) no action by the states and international organization; or
(ii) informal cooperation between national administrators to achieve uniform enforcement against restrictive practices having "harmful
effects."
It is contended that whether the formalization system or the informal
cooperation system is desired, a need to regulate the effects of restrictive
practices on an international level is acknowledged. 31 Historically the first
step to reduce this need would be an individual investigation by all states of
the relevant doctrines of international law. This investigation has occurred,
31The author contends that the need exists; however, the expressed desire for the
aforementioned options would be the evidence needed to prove the contention of the author.
The I.L.A. has acknowledged such a need. For a summary of viewpoints and a proposal to
the I.L.A., see Oliver C.. I.LA. Report of the Fifty-FirstConference, Tokyo, 1964, p. 544.
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and has resulted in the underlying conflicts of the extra-territorial effects of
32
restrictive practice legislation.
The individual recognition of relevant international law doctrines will
not resolve the underlying conflict.
The second step to resolve the aforementioned need is that of the
informal agreement among states, to cooperate in combating the "harmful
effects" of restrictive practices. However, it is contended that the effects of
substantive factual restrictive practices to be combated through this method, are the same as would be combated by a formal treaty or arbitration
agreement.
These effects are the violations of the international customary law in the
"harmful effects" of the fourteen categories. Thus, it may be concluded
that substantive uniformity of purpose exists, in the informal agreement
and the formal agreements. Only the method of enforcement will differ.33 It
is at this level that the decision of the necessity of a formal agreement will
be made.
The third step, which is the formal agreement, responds to the opinion
that something should be stated on the subject. The accepted level of
cooperation is higher than that of non-formalized action, in that the "substantive evils" are identified and formally agreed upon: however, the enforcement procedure may remain at the informal level.
As these "harmful effects" are, at present, identified, it is the contention
of the author that a formal agreement on the effects of factual restrictive
practices which will not be a de novo statement, but only a reflection of the
existing customary law may be concluded and ratified by the regional
organizations and states, without either endangering their avowed policies
on the effects of restrictive practices.
To ensure that the states and organizations do not suffer an infringement
of sovereignty the agreement should not be of a supra-national nature, but
should be firmly based in multilateral cooperation for enforcement of the
prohibitions against "harmful effects." However, the agreement may allow
bilateral and multilateral arrangements which have stricter enforcement
measures.
None of the existing international draft conventions (i.e., I.T.O., or the
U.N. Drafts) fulfill the aforementioned criteria. However, the Havana
Charter "I.T.O." Articles 46 through 54 and the U.N. Draft, may serve as
an excellent starting point.
32
See Ibid., at 304-592, and Fine, Extra-TerritorialApplication of Restrictive Trade
Practice Legislation: a Restatement of Underlying Conflicts, II Diritto Negli Scambi Internazionali,Vol. VI, No.I-2, 1967, p.29 for definition of this problem.
33
0ne is reminded of the differences of enforcement between the I.T.O., U.N. Draft,
E.C.S.C., E.E.C., E.F.T.A., L.A.F.T.A. and C.A.C.M.
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Upon the basis of the Havana Charter and the U.N. Draft:
(1) The fourteen specific categories of customary international law
should be resolved with the seven prohibited categories under the
criterion of "harmful effect";
(2) An article exempting a substantive restrictive practice from the
above prohibition if a domestic societal benefit is contended, should
be added;
(3) Persons, enterprises or organizations should be allowed to institute
complaints in addition to Member nations;
(4) An article should be added allowing the jurisdiction of the courts of
the contracting parties to enforce the prohibitions of the aforementioned harmful effects on their territory and against entities within
their control. Thus, an international cartel would be prohibited
through cooperation. Respect would be paid to all decisions of
courts which would prohibit the "harmful effects," and the jurisdiction problem of extra territorial effect would be removed;
(5) An article should be added, allowing the courts of contracting parties
to request information and documents in a second country, necessary to pending litigation of a "harmful effect" as defined under
suggestion (1);
(6) An article should be added, allowing more stringent bilateral or
multilateral measures in the future, to establish the present treaty as
a minimum level of cooperation; and
(7) An article should be added, establishing legal personality, allowing
an "organization" to institute legal action in the courts of a contracting party, in the instance that consultation fails and the "harmful effect" still exists. Such an action would occur by a regular vote
of all members of the representative body.
A draft treaty of the above nature would acknowledge the existing
customary law, and establish a firm basis for future cooperation. Such a
treaty is as follows:
Part IV: Draft Articles of Agreement
PREAMBLE
For the purpose of
REALIZING the aims set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly the attainment of the higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development,
envisaged in Article 55 of that Charter;
RECOGNIZING the need for co-ordinated national and international
action to attain the following objectives:
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1. To promote the reduction of barriers to trade, governmental and
private, and to promote on equitable terms access to markets, products and productive facilities;
2. To encourage economic development, industrial and agricultural, particularly in under-developed areas;
3. To contribute to a balanced and expanding world economy through
greater and more efficient production, increased income and greater
consumption, and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade; and
4. To promote mutual understanding and cooperation in the solution of
problems arising in the field of international trade in all its aspects;
RECOGNIZING further that national and international action in the
field of restrictive-business practices can contribute substantially to the
attainment of such overall objectives:
ACCORDINGLY the parties to this Agreement agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL POLICY TOWARDS
RESTRICTIVE-BUSINESS PRACTICES
1. Each Member shall take appropriate measures, and shall cooperate with
other Members and the Organization to prevent, on the part of private
or public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets or
foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful
effects on the expansion of production or trade, in light of the objectives
set forth in the Preamble to this Agreement.
2. In order that the Organization may decide in a particular instance
whether a practice has or is about to have the effect indicated in
paragraph I, the Members agree, without limiting paragraph 1, that
complaints regarding any of the practices listed in paragraph 3 shall be
subject to investigation, in accordance with the procedure regarding
complaints provided for in Articles 3 and 5, whenever
(a) such a complaint is presented to the Organization, and
(b) the practice is engaged in, or made effective, by one or more private
or public commercial enterprises or by any combination, agreement
or other arrangement between any such enterprises, and
(c) such commercial enterprises, individually or collectively, possess
effective control of trade among a number of countries in one or
more products.
3. The practices referred to in paragraph 2 are the following:
(a) fixing (1) prices horizontally or vertically; (2) terms or (3) conditions
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to be observed in dealing with others in the purchase, sale or lease
of any product;
(b) excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial
market or field of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing
sales quotas or purchase quotas;
(c) discriminating against or in favor of particular enterprises or groups
of enterprises, or consumers through the use of price-discrimination,
boycott, discriminating terms of sale, or refusal-to-sell techniques;
(d) limiting production of fixing production quotas;
(e) preventing, by agreement or coercion, the development or application of technology or invention whether patented or unpatented,
or withholding the application of such technology with the result of
monopolizing an industrial or commercial field;
(f) attempting to monopolize a market or sector thereof through the use
of methods not consistent with natural growth;
(g) abusing a dominant position in a market or sector thereof;
(h) extending the use of rights under patents, trade marks or copyrights
granted by any Member to matters or writings which, according to
its laws and regulations, are not within the scope of such grants, or
to products or conditions of production, use or sale which are
likewise not the subjects of such grants;
(i) any similar practices which the Organization may declare, by a
majority of two-thirds of the Members present and voting, to be
restrictive business practices.
4. (a) The practices referred to in paragraph (3) will not be considered to
have the effect indicated in paragraph (1) if, upon the investigation
outlined in paragraph 2, the particular practice is pronounced or
interpreted to be of a societal benefit in the state in which the
practice originated; or
(b) The practice will also be exempted in the state which suffers the
effect of the practice, only if the effect is adjudged to be of societal
benefit in such state. In all other instances than those to which
reference is made in this sub paragraph 4b), the procedure outlined
in paragraph 2 shall be followed.
ARTICLE 2
CONSULTATION PROCEDURE
Any affected Member, which considers that in any particular instance a
practice exists (whether engaged in by private or public commercial enterprises), which has or is about to have the effect indicated in paragraph I of
Article 1, may consult other Members directly or request the Organization
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to arrange for consultation with particular Members, with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions. If requested by the Member and if it
considers such action to be justified, the Organization shall arrange for, and
assist in, such consultation. Action under this Article shall be without
prejudice to the procedure provided for in Article 3.
ARTICLE 3
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
1. In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1, any affected
Member, on its own behalf or any Member on behalf of any affected
person, enterprise or organization within that Member's jurisdiction, or any
such person, enterprise or organization may present a written complaint to
the Organization, that in any particular instance a practice exists (whether
engaged in by private or public commercial enterprises), which has or is
about to have the effect indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 1; provided that
in the case of complaints against a public commercial enterprise acting
independently of any other enterprise, such complaints may be presented
only by a Member on its own behalf, and only after the Member has
resorted to the procedure for which provision is made in Article 2.
2. The Organization shall prescribe the minimum information to be included in complaints under this Article. This information shall give substantial indication of the nature of the practices, and the reasons for
alleging the effects indicated in paragraph I of Article 1.
3. The Organization shall consider each complaint presented in accordance with paragraph 1. If the Organization deems it appropriate, it shall
request Members concerned to furnish supplementary information, for
example, information from commercial enterprises within their jurisdiction.
After reviewing the relevant information, the Organization shall decide
whether an investigation is justified.
4. If the Organization is satisfied that the practice in question has specifically been required by governmental measures existing prior to the
complaint, no further investigation under the provisions of this Article shall
be undertaken; provided however, that any practice found to exist in more
than one country may be further investigated in the discretion of the
Organization, if such practice is not so specifically required in all countries
in which it is found to exist. The Organization may, however, bring to the
attention of Members or of any appropriate inter-governmental body or
agency, with such observations as it may desire to make, aspects of
governmental measures that specifically require restrictive-business practices, or aspects of practices, thus required, which may have the effect
indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 1.
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5. If the Organization decides that an investigation is justified, it shall
inform all Members of the complaint, request any Member to furnish such
additional information relevant to the complaint as the Organization may
deem necessary, and shall subsequently afford any Member, and any person, enterprise or organization on whose behalf the complaint has been
made, as well as the commercial enterprises alleged to have engaged in the
practice complained of, reasonable opportunity to be heard.
6. The Organization shall review all information available, and decide
whether the conditions specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article I are
present and, if so, whether the practice in question has, has had or is about
to have the effect indicated in paragraph 1 of that Article.
7. The Organization shall inform all Members of its decision and the
reasons therefor.
8. If the Organization decides that in any particular case the conditions
specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 are present, and are not
exempted under paragraph 3 of Article 1, and that the practice in question
has, has had or is about to have the effect indicated in paragraph 1 of that
Article it shall request each Member concerned to take every possible
remedial action, and may also recommend to the members concerned
remedial measures to be carried out in accordance with their respective
laws and procedures.
9. The Organization may request any Member concerned to report fully to
it on the remedial action it has taken in any particular case.
10. As soon as possible after its proceedings in respect of any complaint
under this Article have been provisionally or finally closed, the Organization shall prepare and publish a report showing fully the decisions
reached, the reasons therefor and any measures recommended to the
Members concerned. The Organization shall not, if a Member so requests,
disclose confidential information furnished by that Member, which if disclosed would substantially damage the legitimate business interests of a
commercial enterprise.
11. The Organization shall report to all Members and make public the
remedial action which has been taken by the Members concerned in any
particular case.
ARTICLE 4
STUDIES RELATING TO RESTRICTIVEBUSINESS PRACTICES
1. The Organization is authorized:
(a) to conduct and publish the results of studies, either on its own
initiative or at the request of any Member or of any organ of the United
Nations or of any other inter-governmental body or agency, relating to:
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(i) general aspects of restrictive-business practices affecting international trade;
(ii) conventions, laws and procedures concerning, for example, incorporation, company registration, investments, securities, prices, markets,
fair trade practices, trade marks, copyrights, patents and the exchange and
development of technology insofar as they are relevant to restrictive business practices affecting international trade;
(iii) the registration of restrictive business agreements and other arrangements affecting international trade; and
(b) to request information from members in connection with such studies.
2. The Organization is further authorized;
(a) to make recommendations to Members concerning such conventions, laws and procedures as are relevant to their obligations under
this Agreement; and
(b) to arrange for conferences of Members to discuss any matters
relating to restrictive-business practices affecting international trade.
ARTICLE 5
OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS
1. Each Member shall take all possible measures by legislation or otherwise, in accordance with its constitution or system of laws and economic
organization, to ensure, within its jurisdiction, that private and public
commercial enterprises do not engage in practices which are as specified in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article I and have the effect indicated in paragraph 1
of that Article and it shall assist the Organization in preventing these
practices.
2. Each Member shall make adequate arrangements for presenting complaints, conducting investigations and preparing information and reports
requested by the Organization.
3. Each Member shall furnish to the Organization, as promptly and as fully
as possible, such information as is requested by the Organization for its
consideration and investigation of complaints, and for its conduct of studies
under this Agreement; provided that any Member, on notification to the
Organization, may withhold information which the Member considers is
not essential to the Organization in conducting an adequate investigation
and which, if disclosed, would substantially damage the legitimate business
interests of a commercial enterprise. In notifying the Organization that it is
withholding information pursuant to this clause, the Member shall indicate
the general character of the information withheld and the reason why it
considers it not essential.
4. Each Member shall take full account of each request, decision and
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recommendation of the Organization under Article 3, and, in accordance
with its constitution or system of law and economic organization, take in
the particular case the action it considers appropriate, having regard to its
obligations under this Chapter.
5. Each Member shall report fully any action taken, independently or in
concert with other Members, to comply with the requests, and carry out
the recommendations of the Organization, and, when no action has been
taken, to inform the Organization of the reasons therefor, and to discuss
the matter further with the Organization if it so requests.
6. Each Member shall, at the request of the Organization, take part in
consultations and conferences provided for in this Agreement, with a view
to reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions.
7. Each Member shall inform the Organization of the results of consultations and conferences provided for in this Agreement, in which such
Member has participated.
8. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require a Member to
furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its
essential security interests.
ARTICLE 6
CO-OPERATIVE REMEDIAL
ARRANGEMENTS
1. Members may co-operate with each other for the purpose of making
more effective within their respective jurisdictions, any remedial measures
taken in furtherance of the objectives of this Agreement, and consistent
with their obligations under other provisions of this Agreement.
2. Members shall keep the Organization informed of any decision to participate in any such co-operative action and of any measures taken.
ARTICLE 7
DOMESTIC MEASURES AGAINST RESTRICTIVEBUSINESS PRACTICES
No act or omission to act on the part of the Organization shall preclude
any Member from enforcing any national statute or decree, directed toward
preventing monopoly or restraint of trade.
ARTICLE 7 bis
POWERS OF THE ORGANIZATION UPON
DEFAULT OF A MEMBER TO
FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS
1.The Organization shall have the power to institute legal action in the
courts of the defaulting Member, to compel the fulfillment of those obligations of members established under Article 5.
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2. Such action may only be instituted (1)upon a negative reply from the
member to the request that the obligations be fulfilled, or (2) after 10 days
have elapsed from the date of the creation of the obligation (i.e. decision,
recommendation or request), without any reply from the member; and the
decision of the Representative Body under the procedure established in
Article 11 paragraph 3, to institute such legal action as referred to in
paragraph I of this Article.
3. Nothing in this article shall override the exemption established in article
5 paragraph 3, and paragraph 8.
ARTICLE 8
SPECIAL PROCEDURES IN
RESPECT OF SERVICES
I. The Members recognize that certain services, such as transportation,
telecommunications, insurance and the commercial services of banks, are
substantial elements of international trade, and that any restrictive business
practices by enterprises engaged in these activities in international trade
may have harmful effects similar to those indicated in paragraph 1 of
Article 1.Such practices, when (a) they are engaged in or made effective
by one or more private or public commercial enterprises or by any combination, agreement or other arrangement between any such enterprises,
and (b) such commercial enterprises individually or collectively possess the
effective control of trade in one or more services among a number of
countries, shall be dealt with in accordance with the following paragraphs
of this Article.
2. If any Member considers that there exist restrictive-business practices
in relation to a service referred to in paragraph 1, which have or are about
to have harmful effects similar to those indicated in paragraph 1, and that
its interests are thereby adversely affected, the Member may submit a
written statement explaining the situation to the Member or Members
whose private or public enterprises are engaged in the services in question.
The Member or Members concerned shall give sympathetic consideration
to the statement and to such proposals as may be made, and shall afford
adequate opportunities for consultation, with a view to effecting a satisfactory adjustment.
3. If no adjustment can be effected in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 2, and if the matter is referred, to the Organization, it shall be
transferred to the inter-governmental body or agency, if one exists, empowered to deal with that type of problem with such observations as the
Organization may wish to make. If no such inter-governmental body or
agency exists, and if Members so request, the Organization may make
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recommendations for, and promote international agreement on, measures
designed to remedy the particular situation so far as it comes within the
scope of this Agreement. For the purpose of framing such recommendations, the Organization may make such arrangements as it deems appropriate to obtain information from Members and, subject to the proviso of
paragraph 3 and to paragraph 8 of Article 5, Members shall co-operate
with the Organization accordingly, provided that due regard is had to their
legal and constitutional systems.
ARTICLE 9
OTHER PROCEDURES
I. Where measures taken by a Member or an inter-governmental body or
agency, or business practices required or approved by any such measure,
relate to the work of the Organization, the Organization may bring the
effect of these measures or practices on its work to the attention of the
Member or inter-governmental body or agency, respectively, with such
observations as it may desire to make.
2. The Organization shall make arrangements with other intergovernmental bodies or agencies to provide for effective co-operation
with respect to restrictive-business practices and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of activities in connection therewith. The Organization
may for this purpose consult with such bodies or agencies, arrange for joint
committees and reciprocal representation at meetings, and establish such
other working relationships as may be appropriate.
3. For the purposes of this article, the words "inter-governmental bodies
or agencies" shall be deemed to include entities which have responsibility
in the field of restrictive-business practices, and which possess sovereign
powers through a delegation of sovereignty by two or more States.
4. The Organization may make suitable arrangements for consultation and
co-operation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters
within the scope of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 10
THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY
I. The Representative Body shall consist of all Members of the Organization. Each Member shall have one representative in the Representative
Body, and may appoint alternates and advisers to its representative.
2. Each Member shall have one vote on the Representative Body.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, decisions of the Representative Body shall be taken by a majority of the Members present and
voting.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3

670

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

4. The Representative Body shall meet in regular sessions at intervals
determined by it, and in such special sessions as shall be convoked by the
executive secretary upon request by the Executive Board, or by one-third
of the Members of the Representative Body.
5. The Representative Body shall establish its rules of procedure, and shall
elect its chairman and other officers.
6. The powers and duties attributed to the agency by this Agreement, and
the final authority to determine the policies of the agency, shall be vested in
the Representative Body.
ARTICLE 11
EXECUTIVE BOARD
i. There shall be an Executive Board.
2. Except insofar as the Representative Body may decide to reserve to
itself specific functions or duties and the powers appropriate thereto, the
Executive Board shall carry out the functions and duties of the Representative Body and exercise its powers; provided that the Executive Board may
refer any question relating to the carrying out of such functions or duties to
the Representative Body, or may request the Representative Body to
assume any such function or duty.
3. The size, composition and voting procedures of the Executive Board
shall be determined by the Representative Body.
4. The members of the Executive Board shall be selected by the Representative Body.
5. In selecting the members of the Executive Board, the Representative
Body shall have regard to the objectives of including Members from the
different types of economics and degrees of economic development to be
found among Members of the Organization, from the broad geographical
areas to which the Members belong, and from countries of chief economic
importance, for which last criterion particular regard shall be paid to
Members' shares in international trade.
6. In accord with policies and procedures established by the Representative Body, Members of the Organization which are not members of the
Executive Board may take part in the work of the Board, when matters of
direct concern to them are under consideration.
ARTICLE 12
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The chief administrative officer of the agency shall be the executive
secretary.
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ARTICLE 13
ADVISORY STAFF
1. The chief advisory officer of the Organization shall be the director of
the advisory staff. He shall be appointed by the Representative Body and
be subject to its general supervision.
2. In accordance with any rules laid down by the Representative Body, the
director shall select the advisory staff and any necessary consultants to it.
3. Members of the advisory staff shall be selected in the light of the
following considerations:
(a) knowledge and experience of the working, and problems of
different types of economy, shall be available to secure; so far as
possible, a proper balance of advice;
(b) due regard shall be had to the desirability of drawing staff from
different geographical areas;
(c) the paramount considerations in the selection of candidates shall be
their competence, integrity, open-mindness and impartiality as individuals.
4. The advisory staff shall exercise its functions in complete independence; in the general interest of all Members, and shall neither solicit
nor accept instructions from any government.
ARTICLE 14
FUNCTIONS OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Pursuant to policies and rules prescribed by the Representative Body,
the executive secretary shall perform the following functions:
(a) Arranging for and assisting in consultations pursuant to the provisions of Article 2.
(b) Examining complaints, checking that the minimum information prescribed in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3 has been supplied,
and, where appropriate, requesting Members to furnish supplementary
information pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 3.
(c) Preparing and transmitting to the Representative Body, advice in
the form of proposals as to (i) whether investigations are justified
pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 3, and (ii)
whether any designated sequence is appropriate in the program of
investigatory work; provided that, if no Members has in - days
submitted observations on any such proposals to the Representative
Body, the proposals shall be regarded as adopted as the decision of the
Representative Body.
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(d) Informing Members and requesting information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 3, Article 4 and paragraph 3 of Article 9. In
requesting information pursuant to this sub-section the executive secretary shall consult the director of the advisory staff with reference to the
types of information required.
(e) Making administrative arrangements for the advisory staff; provided, howeyer, that the selection of members of the advisory staff
shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 13. It
shall at all times be the duty of the executive secretary to facilitate the
work of the advisory staff.
ARTICLE 15
FUNCTIONS OF THE
ADVISORY STAFF

1. Pursuant to policies and rules prescribed by the Representative Body,
the advisory staff shall (a) perform the functions set out in the following
paragraphs of this Article, and (b) advise the Representative Body, subject
to any limitations established by that Body.
2. After the executive secretary has collected information relating to a
complaint in pursuance of the relevant provisions of Article 3, and has
transmitted it to the director of the advisory staff, the director shall arrange
for the analysis of the information and for the preparation of a report by the
advisory staff.
3. The director of the advisory staff shall arrange for opportunities to be
given in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 3, for any Member or any
person, enterprise or organization on whose behalf the complaint has been
made, or any commercial enterprise alleged to have engaged in the practice
complained of, to be heard by the advisory staff; provided, however, that
the Representative Body in its discretion may afford opportunities for such
persons to be heard by it after they have received the report of the
advisory staff.
4. The report of the advisory staff shall set out the facts established by the
information aforesaid, together with such analysis of their effects and
significance in relation to the objectives of the Agreement, as may assist
the Representative Body in carrying out the duties laid on it by the
Agreement.
5. When, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 9, the Representative
Body shall have arranged for the collection of information from Members,
all such information collected by the executive secretary shall be transmitted to the director of the advisory staff, who shall arrange for its
analysis and for the preparation of a report in accordance with paragraph 4
of this Article.
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6. Reports by the advisory staff shall be submitted to the Representative
Body.
7. In response to any request transmitted by the executive secretary, the
director of the advisory staff shall arrange for the conduct by the advisory
staff of such studies as the Representative Body may decide upon pursuant
to the provisions of Article 4, and within terms of reference prescribed by
it, and for the preparation of reports of such studies for consideration by
the Representative Body.
8. It shall be the duty of the director of the advisory staff to give such
advice and assistance as may be requested by the executive secretary, in
carrying out his functions and duties under Article 14.
ARTICLE 16
ACTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
BODY ON COMPLAINTS
1. The Representative Body, in carrying out the duties laid on it by this
Agreement, shall take full account of reports of the advisory staff.
2. At its discretion the Representative Body may refer reports back to the
advisory staff, with a request for any material in such report to be clarified
or amplified, or to be re-examined in the light of any observations transmitted by the Representative Body to the advisory staff,
ARTICLE 17
PUBLICATION OF REPORTS
The Representative Body shall include in any report, prepared in accordance with paragraph 10 of Article 3, the report of the advisory staff as
submitted to them after any reference back in accordance with paragraph 2
of Article 16.
ARTICLE 18
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. The government of each State accepting the Agreement shall deposit an
instrument of acceptance with
, who will inform all governments that have deposited such instruments, of the date of deposit of such
instrument of acceptance and of the day on which the Agreement enters
into force. After the entry into force of the Agreement, each instrument of
acceptance so deposited shall take effect on the sixtieth day following the
day on which it is deposited.
2. The Agreement shall enter into force on the sixtieth day following the
day on which either of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(a) The number of governments which have deposited instruments of
acceptance shall reach twenty or more, and shall cover 65 percent or
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more of the total value of world imports and exports, as set forth in
Annex A;
(b) The number of governments which have deposited instruments of
acceptance shall have reached twenty or more, and shall cover 65
percent or more of the total value of world imports and exports as set
forth in Annex A, and shall include six countries which individually
have 3 percent or more of such total value.
Governments which wish to deposit instruments of acceptance, applicable
only to sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph may so elect.
3. If this Agreement shall not have entered into force by
I the
shall invite those governments which have deposited instruments of acceptance to enter into consultation to determine whether and on what conditions they desire to bring
this Agreement into force.
ARTICLE 19
AMENDMENT, WITHDRAWAL.
AND TERMINATION
1. Any amendment to this Agreement which does not alter the obligations
of Members, shall become effective upon approval by the Representative
Body by a two-thirds majority of its Members.
2. Any amendment which alters the obligation of Members shall, after
receiving the approval of the Representative Body by a two-thirds majority
of its Members, become effective for the Members accepting the amendment on the
day after two-thirds of the Members have given
notification of their acceptance, and thereafter for each remaining Member
upon acceptance by it.
3. In determining whether a proposed amendment shall be considered
under paragraph I or paragraph 2 above, it shall require a two-thirds
majority of the Members present and voting of the Representative Body, to
establish that a proposed amendment does not alter the obligation of
Members and therefore should be considered under paragraph 1. Amendments which are not so established shall be regarded as altering the obligations of Members, and shall be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 2.
4. Any Member may withdraw from the Organization at any time after
from the day of the entry into force of this Agreement. A
withdrawal shall become effective upon the expiration of six months from
the day on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the
executive secretary.
5. This Agreement may be terminated at any time by agreement of
three-fourths of the Members.
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ARTICLE 19 bis
JURISDICTION OF THE JUDICIARY OF
MEMBERS TO INITIATE CASES
OF "HARMFUL EFFECTS"
1. Upon the approval of a member through the deposit of such approval
with the office of the Secretary General, a member may allow legal action
to be instituted against one of its national persons or enterprises if, (1) such
person or enterprise is adjudged to have committed an act resulting in a
"harmful effect" as referred to in Article 1 paragraph 1, by the process
established in Article 1 paragraph 2, and Article 2 and Article 3; (2) the
above conclusions is agreed upon by the member state as per co-operation
through Article 5;
(3) the restrictive practice has its effect within the territory of the second
member under the judgments referred to above in (1) and (2), and is also
adjudged to be an act leading to a "harmful effect" under the viewpoint of
the approving member.
2. Paragraph I does not derogate from the power of a member to entertain
lawsuits within its proclaimed jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 19ter
DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS AND
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
1. Upon the approval of a member through the deposit of such approval
with the office of the Secretary General, a member may allow its judiciary
to entertain legal action for the discovery of documents at the behest of the
judiciary of another member or members, or the enforcement of a judgment
rendered on a practice referred to in Article 1 paragraph 1, said judgment
to have been rendered by the judiciary of the second member, and said
judgment to be final and without further appeals in the second member.
2. Paragraph 1 of this article does not preclude the same action being
taken through another arrangement, such as referred to in Article 6.
ARTICLE 20
INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITION
For the purpose of this Agreement
(a) the term "business practice" shall not be so construed as to include
an individual contract between two parties as- seller and buyer, lessor
or lessee, or principal and agent, provided that such contract is not
used to restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control;
(b) the term "public commercial enterprises" means
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(i) agencies of governments insofar as they are engaged in trade;
and
(ii) trading enterprises mainly or wholly owned by public authority,
provided the Member concerned declares that for the purposes of
this Agreement it has effective control over, or assumes responsibility for, the enterprises;
(c) the term "private commercial enterprises" means all commercial
enterprises other than public commercial enterprises;
(d) the terms "decide" and "decision" as used in Articles 1, 3 (except
in paragraphs 3 and 5) and 5 do not determine the obligations of
Members, but mean only that the Organization reaches a conclusion.
INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO
ARTICLE 8
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to matters relating to
shipping services which are subject to the Convention of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.
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